Ukraine's goals, and NATO's goals, are not identical

And pretending that they are, is dangerous for all concerned. From the Cato Institute:
We're Not All Ukrainians Now

[...] Ukraine, with its independence on the line, wants all the NATO help it can get — escalation serves its interests. NATO countries on the other hand, sensibly wary of Russia and its nuclear arsenal, rightly resist.

So, a gap has opened in Western capitals between deeds that suggest an outer limit of involvement and words that suggest a harmony of interests.

In large part, this is just politics. Leaders of democracies tend to oversell the stakes to promote policies that entail great risk. But such a gap is dangerous.

For one, it attracts domestic calls for escalation, including demands for maximal war aims, from the restoration of Crimea to direct military intervention. Secondly, the White House’s rhetoric also undermines its own refusal to comply with Ukraine’s demands for high‐​risk assistance in the form of no‐​fly zones, the complete economic shutdown of Russia or actual troop deployments, undercutting its own restraint.

But if Western stakes were indeed as dire as Ukraine’s, if the future of the world order hung on the course of this conflict and our democracy was at stake along with Ukraine’s, then why wouldn’t NATO be willing to join the fight for it?

Crucially, this rhetoric‐​policy gap could also raise excessive Ukrainian expectations of support. But those insisting the West should give Ukraine whatever it wants ignore that what Ukraine wants partly depends on what the West will give them — or at least what it says it will. And claims of fully aligned interests may fuel Ukrainian dreams of total victory that are probably untenable and only conducive to prolonging war.

Though peace talks are now at a standstill, they may revive when Russia’s Donbas push either succeeds or ends in stalemate, and Ukraine may again be presented with an unpleasant peace offering — lose Crimea, accept more autonomy for much of the Donbas, commit to neutrality. If Kyiv thinks Western support is endless, or likely to grow more direct, it may end up rejecting a deal it should have taken and suffer for it when the help it banked on doesn’t materialize.

The problem here isn’t helping Ukraine, it’s pretending the help is unconditional. [...]

In short, pretending Western interests are fully aligned with Kyiv’s risks further escalating and prolonging this dangerous war, with consequences far beyond the borders of the countries directly involved. Read the whole article, for embedded links and more.      

Intervention in Syria = American Military

And here are some good reasons why it shouldn't happen:

West must not intervene militarily in Syria

(CNN) -- Some of the bravest, noblest women and men I have met are members of the United States armed forces. To them, military intervention is not about winning a debate on television or sounding smart on Twitter. With the United Nations ruling out support for military options to stop the bloodbath in Homs in Syria, leading U.S. commentators are calling for NATO and the Arab League to intervene militarily.

In reality, this would mean the United States would once again carry the heavy burden of war. In NATO's recent operation in Libya, the United States provided 75% of the reconnaissance data, surveillance, intelligence and refueling planes. Syria is not Libya, and NATO without the United States is not up to the job.

The Arab League is no match for a brutal Syrian regime backed by Russia, China and Iran.

In essence, therefore, we must stop pretending about NATO or the Arab League intervening and accept that it is not "international intervention," but U.S. military intervention that is being sought in yet another Muslim-majority country. The Muslim dimension is important because the lessons of Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan are that, invariably, intervention leads to occupation, which leads to varying degrees of Islamist radicalization.

Whatever the motivations to advance U.S. military intervention, we need to address the following questions before contemplating placing U.S. armed forces in harm's way again, and demanding the U.S. taxpayer foot the bill. [...]

The author goes on to spell it out. He has spent time living in Syria, and has many good insights, on both Syria and the larger picture.


Also see:

Syria: Alawites, Sunnis, the Russia factor...
     

Danish P.M. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is IN

There were doubts he would be given the position, because of Turkish objections over the fake "Danish Cartoon" controversy, among other things. Concessions were made to the Turks:

NATO leaders pick Dane as new secretary-general

STRASBOURG, France – NATO leaders appointed Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO's new secretary-general Saturday after overcoming Turkish objections to a leader who angered Muslims around the world by supporting the right to caricature the Prophet Muhammad.

NATO's outgoing head, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said NATO's 28 member nations reached unanimity after a series of Turkish "concerns" were addressed at the alliance's two-day, 60th-anniversary summit.

Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told reporters that his government's requests had included the closure of a Kurdish satellite television broadcaster based in Denmark; the establishment of contacts between NATO and Islamic countries; appointment of a Turk as an aide to Fogh Rasmussen and senior NATO command positions for Turkish generals.

Erdogan said President Barack Obama had been heavily involved in the negotiations.

"Our president gave his approval after receiving information that our reservations have been addressed under the guarantorship of Obama," Erdogan said. "We hope our concerns will be met."

Obama said there had been "important efforts to make sure that everyone felt included."

Fogh Rasmussen told a NATO news conference in Danish that the station, Roj TV, was being investigated to find out whether it has any ties with the Kurdish militant group PKK or has advocated terror attacks, something the station has repeatedly denied.

"If it can be proven that Roj TV is involved in terror activities, we will of course do all we can to shut down the television station," he said.

"I have not given in to the Turks," he said on Danish television Saturday evening. "Sometimes it is better to sit face-to-face with people," [...]

The concessions to Turkey are understandable. The PKK has been waging terrorist attacks against Turkey, killing Turkish civilians. The Turkish government has every right to fight that aggressively.

But this AP article annoyed me, because it goes on to talk about why Fogh Rasmussen was "controversial", with out talking about the lies that created the fake controversy in the first place. I had posted about it extensively at the time the Danish Cartoon Riots happened:

The Lying Danish Imams
Should be Put to DEATH... according to Islam!

The American Main Stream Media
and the Danish Cartoons

Do we need a "Star Wars" strategy for Islam?

How can the AP talk about "why Fogh Rasmussen was controversial", without telling you the truth about the controversy? About the massive propaganda campaign that was waged by radical Danish Imams, who went on tour with fake cartoons much worse than the ones published by the Danish. The imams claimed those were the ones published, and they told lies about the Danish people attacking Islam, in order to incite Muslims into rioting, to use that as a political force.

Why did the AP leave that part of the story out? I'll tell you why they did: Political Correctness. Truth be damned.

I say, damn the liars. Anyway, hopefully it's a good thing that Rasmussen got in, and that Turkish concerns are being addressed.
     

France to rejoin NATO militarily

It seems French President Sarkozy wants France’s full “reintegration” into the military command structure of NATO, after an absence of more than 40 years:

France in NATO: Why It Matters

[...] Indeed, Sarkozy’s main argument for rejoining NATO is that, given its current level of engagement, France must have a voice at the top in order to defend its own interests. In recent years, France has gradually rejoined the political and operational elements of the Alliance; it now sits on 36 of NATO’s 38 committees. But it has remained absent from the permanent military command structure, which means that it does not participate in the strategic planning that goes into operational deployments. Sarkozy says this must change.

But Sarkozy also has other motives for reaching out to NATO. Full membership of the Alliance will, for example, enhance French military interoperability with the United States and other NATO allies, thereby contributing to the badly needed modernization of French forces. Moreover, Sarkozy hopes that full NATO membership will provide the French defense industry with access to the mammoth US defense procurement market, which accounts for almost half of global defense expenditures.

[...]

Sarkozy has won some important concessions from the United States, one of them being that Washington drop its opposition to ESDP as a quid pro quo for France’s rejoining NATO. At the 45th Munich Security Conference in February, US Vice President Joe Biden declared that America would “warmly welcome” France’s full return to NATO and added that “we also support the further strengthening of European defense” and an “increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security.”

The Americans have also given in to Sarkozy’s demands for a more prominent French role in the Alliance. French Prime Minister Francois Fillon said that France would take over leadership of Allied Command Transformation, a key NATO command post in Norfolk, Virginia, where the alliance’s long-term strategy is discussed. France will also lead the Allied Joint Command Lisbon, which is responsible for NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force and its satellite reconnaissance system.

But France’s return to NATO also has the potential to increase tensions with the United States and other NATO members like Britain. For example, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin says that France rejects a global role for NATO and that the Alliance should remain Eurocentric. He also says that Russia should be consulted before the alliance expands any further. Those positions could put France on a collision course with the White House, which has bigger plans for NATO and has criticized France and Germany for their deference to Russia on questions of European security. [...]

The rest of the article also gives many possible reasons the French may want this, with embedded links. When France achieves a majority Muslim population in 15 years time, it will be interesting to see how the alliance holds up, and what they will do with all the military technology and knowledge they will have gained from us.
     

Georgia, Russia, USA and NATO; what's next?

What is America expected to do? What can it do, and why is it important? Joshua Trevino looks at these questions and more at the Brussels Journal:


Georgia’s Defeat and America’s Options

[...] The postwar settlement remains thoroughly opaque, even if, as the Russians report, the conditions of a ceasefire are agreed. The Russian war aim was never announced — or rather, it only announced itself on the ground — and its political end remains obscure. The formal disposition of the Russian-occupied secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be decided; the mechanisms of reparation, if any, must be agreed upon; and, most troublingly, the Russians are making noises about extraditing Saakashvili to the Hague. Here, a definitive settlement is to everyone’s advantage — not least the Georgians, who are ill-advised to act as if they are anything but beaten. Absurdities like putting Saakashvili in the ICC dock should be rejected, but otherwise, it is almost certainly best to let the Russians dictate their terms — and let resistance to those terms emanate from sources able to make that resistance count, like Europe and the United States.

With this in mind, the first task of America’s postwar policy in the Caucasus is distasteful in the extreme: pushing the Georgians to understand and act like what they are, which is a defeated nation in no position to make demands. This does not square easily with American sentiment — nor my own — nor with the Vice President’s declaration that Russia’s aggression “must not go unanswered,” nor with John McCain’s declaration that “today we are all Georgians.” Russia’s aggression and consequent battlefield victory will stand, and as the last thing the volatile Caucasus needs is yet another revisionist, revanchist state, it befits a would-be member of the Western alliance to make its peace with that. However inflammatory the issue of “lost” Abkhazia and South Ossetia are in the Georgian public square, it is nothing that the Germans, the Finns, and the Greeks, to name a few, have not had to come to terms with in the course of their accessions to the first tier of Western nations. We should not demand less of Georgia.

The second, and more enduring, task of our policy must be the swift containment of Russia. I use the term deliberately: to invoke another Cold War-era phrase, we’re not going to “roll back” any of Russia’s recent territorial gains, nor should we attempt to reverse what prosperity it has achieved in the past decade. (That prosperity, being based mostly upon transitory prices for natural resources, will itself be transitory in time.) Russia’s leadership has declared that it seeks the reversal, de facto if not de jure, of the “catastrophe” of the USSR’s end. Though not marked by any formal decision in the vein of Versailles, this is nonetheless a strategic outcome that America has a direct interest in preserving. That interest has only gone up with the admission of former Soviet-bloc states — and former Soviet states — to NATO. Inasmuch as Russian revisionism threatens the alliance that has kept the peace in Europe for generations now, it must be confronted and deterred.

The obvious question is how this may be done with the tools America has at hand. It is a media commonplace over the past several days that the United States has no leverage over Russia. This is false. American policy can and does tremendously affect several things of tremendous importance to Moscow. A brief (though not comprehensive) list of available pressure points follows: [...]

(bold emphasis mine) Yes, we do have leverage, but it's a delicate dance we have to do. Do read the whole thing, it makes a lot of sense.

Russia may not be our friend, but it's not our enemy either, and we don't want to needlessly make it into one. We have mutual interests, and reasons to form alliances on many issues. What leverage we have, we need to use carefully.


Related Links:

Georgia on my mind

Georgia Map at WorldAtlas.com

Russia, Georgia, and the Western Alliance

Russia, Georgia, and the Russian Question

Russia is a bully but Georgia is not blameless